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This means that they are strictly monotheistic and that God alone has the right to be worshipped. However, the concept of tawhid goes deeper, God is the only righteous ruler in every aspect of human life. Salafis take these old texts literal and apply them to all aspects of their daily lives Wiktorowicz, Another key concept is the practice of takfir which is declaring other Muslims as kuffar or infidels.

According to Islamic law the punishment for apostasy is death.

Basically, everyone who does not follow the strict Salafi creed is an infidel. All Salafis follow the same creed, but only Jihadi-Salafists try to reach their goals mainly — or only — by use of a holy war against the unbelievers or jihad Wiktorowicz, According to Karen Armstrong , the deep roots of the Islamic State lie in one particular branch of Salafism , namely the state ideology of Saudi Arabia called Wahhabism. This resulted in two forms of Wahhabism : on the one hand the mainly intellectual form of Wahhab himself and on the other hand the more violent form of the Saud dynasty.

After the dead of Wahhab, Wahhabism became more violent and mainly an instrument of state terror. This Brotherhood used the Wahhabist ideology to legitimate the slaughter of so-called infidels and slit the throats of all male captives Armstrong, A routine now executed on daily basis by the soldiers of the Islamic State.

As stated before, the Muslim Brotherhood can be seen as the prototype of all modern Islamist organizations, so it also influenced IS. However, in practice al-Banna saw this more as a long term ideal. In reality the Brotherhood focusses more on Islamization of the society from within the political system. One of the most articulate thinkers of the Brotherhood, Sayyed Qutb , was more radical in his thoughts and is still a big source of inspiration for many radical Islamists.

Qutb argued that the Islamic world was in moral decay and came up with the concept of jahiliyya which refers to the pre-Islamic period of ignorance. There is still debate if Qutb actually was more a Salafi than a Muslim Brother, but it might be clear that he held a number of Salafi precepts Wiktorowicz, Then what does the Islamic State make so different? IS differs in two ways from these organizations. In the first place, as its name claims, it is a state. Al Qaeda can be seen as quite successful in committing attacks in the Middle East and the West, but it never came anywhere close to reaching an Islamic State.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a huge organization with political influence in a growing amount of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but the ideal of an actual Islamic State looks still far away. And there it was, coming out of nowhere, an actual Islamic caliphate declared by a Sunni rebel group named itself the Islamic State.

The group captured a territory roughly the size of Hungary and broke the Sykes-Picot borders of Iraq and Syria Hamid, Ninety years after the fall of the last Islamic State, the Ottoman Empire, the caliphate was back. Although most Muslims strongly disagree with the practices of IS, the notion of an Islamic caliphate has a broad resonance among Muslim-majority populations.

A survey on attitudes towards a caliphate found that 65 percent of respondents in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Indonesia supported the idea of a caliphate Hamid, The fact that IS actually governs a territory gives the group legitimacy and makes it more powerful. However, this strength also seems to become its weakness since the territory of the caliphate declines fast. In the second place IS is more severe or pious, more professional and more brutal than former Islamist organizations.

Of course most Muslims will not agree with the statement that IS is more pious, in fact they will say that IS is not pious at all. After every horrendous deed follows a statement of an IS ideologist that explains why they did it and that it is all based on Islamic scriptures Wood, The group has a professional media center called al-Hayat , which is responsible for posting beheading videos on social media and launching a propaganda magazine. IS is very successful in reaching young Muslims all over the world on social media and encouraging them to join the fight, either in Syria or in their home countries.

The first propaganda magazine is called Dabiq , named after a city in Syria where according to some Muslim traditions the final battle between the real Muslims and the infidels will take place, resulting in a final apocalypse Wood, In this magazine IS proudly explains and defends their horrifying behavior.

They explain for example why they take Yazidi women and use them as sex slaves. According to IS they just follow Islamic law, Yazidis are monotheists and therefore it is legitimate to use them as sex slaves Wagenmakers, IS is in its ideology far more severe and radical than its predecessors. The group sees everyone that not follows its creed as an infidel and therefore a legitimate target.

Most Muslims believe that defensive jihad is a duty or at least legitimate, so when Muslims or Muslim lands are attacked they have to fight back. Interpretation plays a big role here, because most Muslims would argue that its only allowed to fight combatants. IS states that there is a war between Muslims and unbelievers, so that basically makes every non-Muslim a legitimate target. But they go even further than that, they also emphasize an offensive jihad. For IS it does not really matter if you are a combatant, a civilian, a woman or even a child Bunzel, The reason why they hate us is very simple, we do not believe in Allah so we are disbelievers.

Western leaders, journalists and apostate imams will continue to make us believe that they mainly hate us for colonialism and discrimination, but they only do this because they are afraid to be politically incorrect. IS will never stop hating us until we embrace Islam Dabiq, Issue This last issue of Dabiq was published in the summer of , in the meantime IS launched a new magazine called Rumiyah.

The title refers to Rome, which IS wishes to conquer as they see it as the capital of the Christian Western world Clarion Project, The change of the name of the magazine has as well a very practical reason as a more strategical reason. The second reason is that IS has to anticipate on losing its territory and so losing its caliphate.

As stated before the possession of territory gives the group more legitimacy and makes it more attractive than its predecessors, but the caliphate is declining fast and is likely to disappear in the near future. IS always followed a twofold strategy of building an Islamic State and carrying terrorist attacks outside its territory The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Since the declining of its territory the group focusses more on the latter one. IS has professional training camps where it trains Western jihadis so that they can go back to their home countries and carry out attacks there.

The group recently also calls for lone wolves to carry out attacks in the West, and however these attacks are usually less professional they can still be very effective as we have seen in San Bernardino, Berlin and Istanbul. With the fast decline of the caliphate, it is very likely that thousands of military trained jihadis will return to their homelands and continue their holy war there. This means for the future that IS is likely to lose its broad legitimacy, but also that the group still will be a big threat to Western societies.


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Conclusion The so-called Islamic State can be seen in the line of Islamic revivalist movements that emerged in the early twentieth century as a reaction to the expansion of Western modernity. However, the group differs in two important ways from its predecessors. In the first place because the Islamic State is an actual state with territory. However most Muslims strongly disagree with the brutalities of IS, the notion of an Islamic State finds broad resonance among Muslims, it gives the group legitimacy and makes it somehow attractive.

In the second place because the group is more severe and pious, more professional and more brutal than its predecessors. It claims that there is a war going between the true Muslims and the infidels, which makes everyone who does not follow the IS ideology a legal target. The group is furthermore very successful in reaching young Muslims all over the world with their propaganda channels on social media and encouraging them to join the fight, either in Syria or in their home countries.

With the decline of the caliphate the so-called Islamic State is likely to lose its broad legitimacy and attractiveness, but this does not mean that the group no longer is a threat. IS is shifting its focus more towards carrying out attacks in the West. These ideologies appeared most publicly when the Ottoman Empire began to lose its hold on the Middle East to European powers during the beginning of the twentieth century Al Jazeera, This colonial division, known as the Sykes Picot Agreement is still considered one of the main reasons for conflict in the Middle East nowadays.

The Arabs had no say about this post-war partition of their lands. The ideal of Arab unity can be separated in two supra-state identities, Arab nationalism and political Islam. Arab nationalism emphasized the historical and cultural affinity of all Arabic-speaking peoples. The most important goals of Arab nationalism are the unity of the Arab peoples and the fighting of Western colonialism.

Pan-Arab nationalism was the leading ideology in the Arab world with the president of Egypt, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, as the leading exponent Mandaville, , p. The idea is to create unity on basis of the Islamic umma, the Islamic community. Political Islam has also its roots in Egypt, with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in by Hassan al-Banna Mandaville, , p. After the Arab uprisings in a lot has changed in the Middle East and there is still a lot happening in the region. The nation state is under fire and several groups call for unity.

The question is if this unity is more likely to be found in the Arab identity or in the Islamic identity. In this essay I analyze which of these ideologies is the most potent force in the future. I first give a brief overview of the history of Arab nationalism.


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  4. Then I do the same for political Islam. After that I make an analysis which ideology is most potent, based on recent developments like the Arab uprisings. Every person who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know this or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for his position. It may be the result of ignorance — then we must teach him the truth. It may be because he is unaware or deceived — then we must awaken him and reassure him.

    It may be a result of selfishness — then we must work to limit his selfishness Cleveland, , p. Arab nationalism already emerged in the Ottoman Empire, against Turkification and Zionism. The rise of Arabism in the Ottoman Empire, called the Arab awakening, had two sources. First there were the minorities of Arab speaking Christians who transformed Arabic into a modern language. Second there was the Muslim elite emphasizing on the greatness of the Arabs resided in their privileged understanding of Islam Kramer, , p. The Ottomans tolerated Jewish immigration because they believed it would benefit the empire, this policy united the Arabs in their criticism.

    Yet, as long as the Ottoman Empire lasted, the Arab nationalist movement was marginal. After the first world war there were two commitments that played an important role in the rise of Arabism.

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    Second the Balfour Declaration, that promised the Jews a home in Palestine. The Arab nationalists felt a deep grievance towards the French and the British for this and Arabism began to redefine itself as a reaction towards Western imperialism Kramer, , p The war in Palestine showed the Arabs that they were weak and that there was a revolution necessary to strengthen the Arab peoples. Nasser became a hero in the Arab world after his victory in the Suez Crisis.

    He came into power and combined a socialist agenda with the idea of Arab unity. They called themselves revolutionaries and wanted a single Arab state in which socialism was a necessity. From till Arab nationalism was the hegemonic ideology in most Arab states with the emergence of the United Arab Republic UAR in as its zenith Hinnebusch, , p.

    The collapse was a beginning of a long slide of Arab nationalism. The Arabs expected to be stronger than in , but this war showed them that they only had become weaker Kramer, , p. This realization gave rise to another ideology, namely political Islam. He makes a distinction between Islamism and radical Islamism. Islamists seek to implement an Islamic political order and they try to do so within the modern state system, so often they are using democracy to reach their goal.

    Sometimes these groups emphasize on violent resistance, but their goals are defined in national liberation and Islamism within a single state. Radical Islamists reject the modern sovereign nation state and seek to establish a pan-Islamic polity or caliphate. In order to establish this, the violent struggle or jihad is the primary method Mandaville, , p. The Ikhwan al Muslimine or Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in by Hassan al-Banna, can be seen as the prototype of all modern Islamist movements Mandaville, , p.

    The goal of the Brotherhood is the Islamization of the society in a political way. Sayyid Qutb, their most important ideologist made a brief account of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in 5 slogans Qutb, , p. Qutb was convinced that Egypt under Nasser was under threat of losing its Islamic identity through Western influence. He called this jahiliyyah , which refers to pre-Islamic times when there was ignorance. It was clear for him that the Nasser regime had to go and violence was the way to achieve that.

    Qutb got arrested and executed by the Egyptian regime for his anti-regime ideology, but his ideas lived on. Many other key ideologues got arrested and the Brotherhood was been driven underground Mandaville, , p. The Muslim Brotherhood is most associated with Egypt but it has a broad ideology with movements in Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia Mandaville, , p. Islamist organizations as the Muslim Brotherhood use only violence when they see no other option and they do it usually only on a national scale. The Muslim Brotherhood tries to gain power via electoral means which is been quite successful in recent times.

    The so-called radical Islamists are different in two ways. They are politically radical because they reject the system of nation-states and want to replace that with a caliphate. Also their method is radical because they try to reach their goals mainly — or only — by the use of violent struggle jihad. The legacy of Sayyid Qutb made several more militant factions of the Muslim Brotherhood depart and form jihadist groups. Geopolitics plays an important role in the emergence of the global jihadi movement.

    During the Soviet war in Afghanistan mujahideen fighters fought a guerilla war against the Soviets. The war was framed as a jihad against the atheists and soon other radical Islamists joined the fight Mandaville, , p The diversity of countries of origin where the fighters came from gave them the feeling they were fighting for a Muslim cause. When the war was over these fighters went to their homeland and spread their radical ideas. As David Cook puts it:. The battlefield of Afghanistan was the religious and social incubator for global radical Islam in that it established contacts among a wide variety of radicals from Muslim antigovernmental and resistance movements and fused them together Mandaville, , p.

    One of the founders within this mujahideen movement was Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Bin Laden was a rich Saudi citizen who quickly developed a reputation as a dedicated fighter in Afghanistan. With the possibilities of transnational communication and travel in a globalizing world a global jihad was born Mandaville, , p. The far most dramatic and important in its consequences were the September 11, attacks on New York and Washington D. Mandaville, , p. This led to a power vacuum with sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis as a result.

    This group gave a new dimension to the global jihadi movement by proclaiming an actual caliphate in Iraq and Syria. ISIS acts far more professional than Al-Qaeda, and shocks the world with horrifying beheading videos. The first strategy is not that successful anymore, after a broad coalition started to bomb ISIS targets the caliphate is declining rapidly.

    Now the end of the caliphate is near, it is likely that the group puts full emphasis on the second strategy. But the group also inspires so-called lone wolves to strike in the West as we have seen in Orlando and other occasions CNN, The potency of ISIS as a real Islamic State can be considered small, they are too radical and they have made too many enemies to keep hold of a big territory. As an ideology and a threat to the West ISIS seems more potent than any radical Islamist group before, the group is capable of activating extremists all over the world and with the collapse of the caliphate many jihadists will go elsewhere.

    After the Arab uprisings in the Islamic political parties were quite successful — both classic Islamist and newly enfranchised conservative Salafis Mandaville, , p.

    Although the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was short, Mohamed Mursi had to leave after a military coup, it might be clear that the Muslim brothers still have a lot of followers. These pragmatic Islamists use democracy to achieve power, but once they have the power they often use it to eliminate the opposition, as we have seen in Turkey after the failed coup. Yusuf al-Qardawi, a religious scholar from Egypt and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, has a weekly television show at Al Jazeera where he spread his Islamist ideas.

    Al-Qardawi is very popular in the Islamic world and he influences Muslims all over the world Benyaich, In one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Youssef Nada, said in an Egyptian newspaper that the Muslim brotherhood counts more than million people worldwide Benyaich, Arab nationalism looks the less potent force. Nasserism died in together with the dead of the pan-Arab hero and wannabe successors as Muamar Gaddafi failed Hinnebusch, , p.

    Some scholars like Abu Khalil think that Arab nationalism persists in a combination with Islamism and democracy, he calls this the new Arab ideology. He himself admits although that Islam — as a political ideology rather than as a body of theology — remains the single most popular movement in the Arab world Abu Khalil, The only way Arabism can survive is by adjusting Islamism. With the rise of ISIS, radical Islamism got a new dimension and their use of modern media showed that their ideology can attract more people than ever before, even in the West.

    Although the popular appeal of radical Islam stays relatively small, it can become or already is a major threat. The Muslim Brotherhood has a lot of followers worldwide and can be seen as a very potent force. The Muslim Brotherhood had also some radical periods and their leading ideologue Sayyid Qutb is still a big inspiration for many radical Islamists. Can Islamist and Arabist ideologies converge on the issue of unity? Benyaich, B. Islam en Radicalisme bij Marokkanen in Brussel. Cleveland, W. Hinnebusch, R. Mandaville, P. Rogan, E. Dude, Bush, he was such a badass.

    In comparison with him, Bin Laden and Al-Baghdadi are saints. So yeah, that bit of terrorism that happens to us now is the backlash we could expect, we kind of deserve it. A hopeful thought. The politicians will say it regardless of how much it stands in opposition to facts and common sense just to garner as many votes as they can for the next election cycle. To fight this false narrative ISIS gives us 6 reasons why they hate us and why they fight us in order of importance:. So yeah, foreign policy plays a role, but they point out very clearly that this role is secondary.

    The fact is, even if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary reason for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam. Even if you were to pay jizyah and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation, we would continue to hate you. No doubt, we would stop fighting you then as we would stop fighting any disbelievers who enter into a covenant with us, but we would not stop hating you.

    Sinds 11 september is het Westen in de ban van islamitisch terrorisme, er volgden aanslagen in Madrid, Londen, Parijs, Brussel en vele aanslagen buiten Europa met talloze doden tot gevolg. Met de opkomst van de Islamitische Staat IS is de frequentie van islamitisch gelegitimeerde aanslagen alleen maar toegenomen.

    In Europese steden heerst angst voor nieuwe aanslagen en ook politici zijn naarstig op zoek naar antwoorden. Honderden West-Europese jongeren voelen zich aangetrokken tot het jihadisme. De daders en verdachten van deze aanslagen hebben allemaal banden met een terreurnetwerk dat groeide en bloeide in inmiddels beruchte Brusselse deelgemeenten als Molenbeek en Schaarbeek. Waarom zijn juist deze jongeren zo gevoelig voor radicalisering?

    Is het toeval, of zijn er andere factoren die een grote rol spelen?

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    Tot nu toe lijken maatregelen om radicalisering en terroristische aanslagen tegen te gaan nog niet echt te werken. Essentieel bij het maken van passend beleid is het begrijpen van deze jongeren. Wat drijft hen en wat kunnen we doen om hun drijfveren te veranderen? Daarom ga ik in dit paper op zoek naar de oorzaken van de radicalisering van de leden van het Brusselse terreurnetwerk. Uit bovenstaande blijkt evident de maatschappelijke relevantie van dit onderzoek.

    De wetenschappelijke relevantie is echter ook zeer groot. Er zijn grofweg twee stromingen die de oorzaken van terrorisme verklaren, de ene stroming stelt dat de oorzaken vooral sociaaleconomisch van aard zijn en de andere dat de oorzaken vooral ideologisch van aard zijn. De Franse islamexpert Olivier Roy stelt echter dat het tegenover elkaar stellen van deze twee stromingen leidt tot een impasse.

    Volgens hem is er niet zozeer sprake van een radicalisering van de islam, maar eerder van een islamisering van radicalisme. De oorzaken zijn dus niet vooral sociaaleconomisch of ideologisch van aard, maar eerder psychologisch De Groene Amsterdammer, Het is niet eenvoudig om achter de individuele drijfveren van deze personen te komen, maar ik hoop een soort rode draad te ontdekken en op die manier een bijdrage te leveren aan het verklaren van de aantrekkingskracht van het jihadisme.

    Het wetenschappelijke debat over islamitisch terrorisme speelt zich al enige tijd af tussen twee dominante stromingen. De ene stroming stelt dat de oorzaken vooral op sociaaleconomisch vlak te vinden zijn en de andere stroming meent dat de oorzaken vooral ideologisch van aard zijn. In voegde de Franse islamdeskundige Olivier Roy daar een theorie aan toe die psychologische factoren als de grootste oorzaak ziet. Sociaaleconomische factoren Over de eerste stroming kan ik vrij kort zijn omdat deze theorie niet specifiek geldt voor islamitisch terrorisme maar op allerlei vlakken van de samenleving wordt toegepast.

    Verschillende wetenschappers gaan ervan uit dat economische condities een grote rol spelen bij het ontstaan van terrorisme. Armoede en inkomensongelijkheid dragen bij aan een gevoel van deprivatie en onrecht, zodoende ontstaan er politieke spanningen.

    Mensen die weinig te verliezen hebben zijn gevoeliger voor radicalisering zo is de redenering. Volgens deze theorie is het belangrijkste wapen tegen terrorisme dan ook het tegengaan van armoede en ongelijkheid Wolfensohn, Hoewel dit heel voor de hand liggend lijkt, blijkt uit verschillende cases dat deze theorie niet altijd opgaat. De aanslagen van 11 september op de Twin Towers werden bijvoorbeeld gepleegd door hoogopgeleide terroristen, geleid door een rijke religieuze fanaticus Burgoon, Ideologische factoren Anderen stellen dat het islamitisch terrorisme vooral gedreven wordt door ideologie, oftewel een bepaalde interpretatie van de islam.

    Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam. Volgens hem zijn de oorzaken dus van religieuze aard en speelt de islam een belangrijke rol, tenminste in het geval van IS.

    Deze groep legitimeert elke daad met theologische teksten uit de Koran of de Hadith. Om iets meer te begrijpen van deze ideologie en hoe deze ideologie tot terrorisme kan leiden is enige kennis van de islam, en met name van het salafisme, nodig. De term salaf verwijst naar de eerste vrome moslims, met als ultieme voorbeeld de profeet Mohammed. Het doel is het strikt repliceren van de islam ten tijde van de eerste rechtschapen moslims. Daarnaast hangen salafisten een doctrine van isolatie aan, dit houdt in dat zij zich moeten isoleren van de rest van de wereld en dus niet mogen deelnemen aan het dagelijks leven zoals anderen dat doen Wiktorowicz, Ten eerste zijn er puristen, zij streven ernaar zo strikt mogelijk volgens de Koran en Hadith te leven maar bemoeien zich niet met aardse aangelegenheden.

    Geweld keuren ze dan ook af. Ten tweede zijn er politieke salafisten, zij streven een islamitische wereldorde na en keuren het gebruik van geweld daarbij niet af. Ten slotte zijn er jihadisten, zij zien het als hun religieuze plicht om een heilige oorlog te voeren tegen een ieder die niet de zuiver islam aanhangt. Veruit het grootste gedeelte van de salafisten behoort tot de eerste groep en is dus niet direct gevaarlijk.

    De tweede groep is aanzienlijk kleiner en vormt een potentieel gevaar omdat de scheiding tussen politieke salafisme en jihadisme niet altijd even duidelijk is. Jihadisten ten slotte vormen slechts een kleine minderheid van het salafisme, maar zijn een direct gevaar voor de samenleving Wiktorowicz, Wetenschappers die ervan uitgaan dat ideologische motieven een belangrijke rol spelen denken dat de oplossing van het probleem dan ook vooral binnen de ummah moslimgemeenschap te vinden is.

    De moslimgemeenschap moet zich hervormen en opstaan tegen salafistische en jihadistische denkers. Ook deze theorie lijkt vrij voor de hand liggend.

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    Moslims worden in religieuze teksten opgeroepen de wapens op te pakken en vrome moslims geven hieraan gehoor. De vraag is echter of deze religieuze teksten gelden als inspiratie voor geweld of als excuus. Psychologische factoren Volgens de Franse islamexpert Olivier Roy is het laatste het geval, de islam dient niet zozeer als inspiratie maar vooral als een excuus.

    Hij stelt dat West-Europese terroristen allemaal dezelfde patronen delen. Het zijn veelal tweede generatie moslims die een opleiding in het Westen hebben gevolgd en een westerse taal spreken. De meesten van hen zijn wedergeboren moslims, ze werden pas in Europa bewust moslim. Ze representeren geen islamitische traditie, sterker nog ze breken met de gematigde religie van hun ouders Roy, , p. De radicalisering van de Westerse moslimjeugd wordt vaak gezien als een spill-over effect van de crisis in het Midden-Oosten.

    Maar volgens Roy klopt dit niet, de terroristen komen zelden uit Palestina, Afghanistan of Irak en veel vaker uit landen als Marokko of Pakistan. Ook is er volgens Roy geen specifiek sociologisch profiel dat deze radicalen verbindt aan een bepaalde sociaaleconomische situatie. Veel van deze jongeren komen uit lagere klassen, maar dat geldt voor een hele grote groep waarvan het merendeel niet radicaliseert.

    Radicalisering vindt plaats binnen het kader van een kleine groep lokale vrienden, die elkaar vaak hebben ontmoet in een jeugdbende of de gevangenis. Ze zijn meer op zoek naar spectaculaire actie dan naar het bouwen van een constructieve politieke basis voor hun idealen. Dit kortetermijndenken is waarschijnlijk ook hun grootste zwakte. Een ander belangrijk element is het mixen van islamitische terminologie met een typisch Westers anti-imperialisme en derdewereld radicalisme. De oplossing ligt volgens Roy bij een Europese of westerse islam. De islam moet geaccepteerd worden als een westerse godsdienst en moslims als westerse burgers.

    Dit betekent niet per definitie een liberale islam, het christendom is immers ook niet liberaal, maar het betekent dat westerse waarden zich ontwikkelen binnen de islam. Verder moet er volgens Roy vooral geluisterd worden naar jonge westerse moslims Roy, , p. Eerst onderzoek ik hoe het gesteld is met de sociaaleconomische factoren in Brussel. Hierbij maak ik gebruik van het boek Islam en radicalisme bij Marokkanen in Brussel van de Belgisch-Marokkaanse politicoloog Bilal Benyaich en andere wetenschappelijke bronnen aangevuld met data uit de media. Bij het analyseren van ideologische factoren maak ik wederom gebruik van het boek van Benyaich, aangevuld met data van andere onderzoekers.

    Om psychologische factoren, zoals omschreven door de Franse islamexpert Olivier Roy, te analyseren heb ik een selectie gemaakt uit leden van het Brusselse terreurnetwerk. Ik heb ervoor gekozen om aan de hand van de achtergrond van Abdelhamid Abaaoud doodgeschoten door de politie vlak na de aanslagen in Parijs , Salah Abdeslam gevangen genomen vlak voor de aanslagen in Brussel , Ibrahim el-Bakraoui blies zichzelf op bij luchthaven Zaventem en Khalid el-Bakraoui blies zichzelf op bij metrostation Maalbeek de these van Roy te toetsen.

    Ik heb voor deze vier personen gekozen omdat zij als hoofdverdachten zijn aangemerkt en er veel gegevens over hen te vinden zijn in de media. Marokkanen en moslims in Brussel Brussel is historisch gezien een migrantenstad en deze status wordt de laatste jaren alleen maar versterkt. Een aanzienlijk deel van deze migranten is afkomstig uit Marokko.

    Naar schatting wonen er ongeveer Het aantal moslims in Brussel wordt geschat tussen de 22 en 35 procent. Dit is lastiger in te schatten omdat het begrip moslim subjectiever is dan nationaliteit. Onder Marokkaanse Brusselaars ligt dit percentage iets hoger, zij zijn over het algemeen godsdienstiger en blijken ook een grotere mate van versterking van de geloofsovertuiging gekend te hebben zo blijkt uit onderzoek van de Universiteit van Rabat in opdracht van de Koning Boudewijnstichting Saaf e.

    Bovenstaande cijfers zijn nog niet heel opmerkelijk of schokkend te noemen maar dit beeld verandert als we kijken waar de meeste Marokkanen en moslims in de stad wonen. Bijna de helft van de Brusselaren en ruim driekwart van de allochtonen leeft in driehonderd achtergestelde buurten. In tegenstelling tot de beruchte banlieues in Frankrijk bevinden deze buurten zich niet aan de rand van de stad, maar in het centrum en westen van het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest.

    Wijken als Molenbeek, Schaarbeek en Anderlecht hebben te maken met hoge werkloosheidscijfers, lage levensverwachting, slecht onderwijs, onveiligheid, slechte kennis van de landstaal enzovoorts. Marokkaanse Brusselaars zijn sterk oververtegenwoordigd in deze achterstandswijken, de helft van de Marokkaanse Belgen leeft onder de armoedegrens Benyaich, Hieruit volgt niet zozeer diversiteit, maar eerder apartheid.

    De autochtone en allochtone bevolking van Brussel komen nauwelijks met elkaar in aanraking en leven grotendeels langs elkaar heen. Deze segregatie wordt onder andere in de hand gewerkt door de betaalbaarheid van woningen. Sociale en culturele factoren vergroten deze segregatie alleen maar. Bepaalde Brusselse wijken ogen zo Marokkaans of zelfs islamitisch dat het voor veel migranten aantrekkelijk is om zich daar te vestigen Benyaich, Dit heeft ook zijn weerslag op het onderwijs.

    Uit onderzoek van de Brusselse sociologen Dirk Jacobs en Andrea Rea blijkt dat dit sterk samenhangt met het opleidingsniveau van de moeder. Veel Belgische Marokkanen kiezen ervoor te trouwen met een partner uit Marokko. Hun kinderen worden daarom wel de eeuwige tweede generatie genoemd. Daar komt nog bij de segregatie en discriminatie in het onderwijs.

    Dit geeft jongeren het gevoel alleen op de eigen groep aangewezen te zijn en versterkt het wij-zij denken enorm. Uit het eerder geschetste beeld volgt logischerwijs een hoge werkloosheid onder allochtone jongeren. Sam Somers just shrugged when asked for a ballpark estimate of how many surveillance cameras there were in the city. We got them here at the police station to surveil our parking lots and for interviews. Companies needed to know more about our habits. The forces of capitalism have worked aggressively in recent years to create profiles of how we behave, and it now appears that the government is also ratcheting up its Big Brother tactics.

    Yet, since last year, through executive orders as well as legislative acts like the USA Patriot Act and Homeland Security Act, government officials have sought an unprecedented expansion of their authority to pry into our private lives. The old tools of wiretaps and subpoenas used against American citizens became much easier to attain, and the feds have borrowed on private-sector marketing techniques to profile us, such as seizing records from libraries and booksellers about our tastes in reading materials. Both the public and private sectors say they have good reasons for spying on us and have only the best of intentions.

    Corporations want to understand our tastes and choices better, so they can serve us with better products and services. Government watches us to save us from the terrorists and other evildoers in our midst. Seemingly sound arguments can be constructed in both cases, with all kinds of doomsday case studies cited as proof.

    So, the question becomes how much power we want to give government officials like John Poindexter, the lying former Iran-Contra figure who now heads the IAO, or to the corporate predators who have pilfered our k s and sold out the public trust for the sake of higher profits. By Steven T. Jones This article was published on See all stories published in Essay. See all stories published in Opinions. Reader Comments No comments yet. Be the first by posting your comment below. Sign in to submit a comment:. Submit Your Comment Comments posted may be subject to moderation.

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